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To get a broad picture of the changes of minds and attitudes during the last decades of the
Soviet Union contemporary western research on professional and other indirect groups is
offering some material. Thesis is, that although the political system did not allow open
discussions using hard facts considerable differences of opinions are documented in the
Soviet media. The indirect groups though communicating in these media did not have a
chance for a transition to preparliamentary organisations within the Soviet system (raising
by comparison the question, whether such transitions will work in other Communist
countries).
Copyright  2014, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. The narrative “the intelligentsia against
communism”
The intellectual history of the Brezhnev-Period mostly
has been written as history of a relatively small and locally
focussed minority, the “intelligentsia” ﬁghting against
Communism and the Bolshevik state. Dietrich Beyrau has
described this history as “selfemancipationwithin a society
characterised by force”.1 Beyrau followedmainly the causes
célèbres from Pasternak’s Dr. Zhivago to Solzhenicyn’s
Archipel Gulag and in that context the development ofarch Center, Hanyang
vier
Selbstbefreiung im
nter, Hanyang University. Prod“informal communities of solidarity and mind” within the
intelligentsia.2 Alexei Yurchak followed the same narrative
of the life of the intelligentsia from Stalin to Gorbachev,
emphasising the virtuality of their intellectual world, in
which constructs of mind claimed an eternal appearance,
as if they were forever – only to vanish completely
following 1990.3 Vladislav Zubok focussed on the years
following the (Non-)-publication of Dr. Zhivago and Pas-
ternaks funeral 1960.4 He gives an especially vivid account
of one of the main localities, the obshezhitie, where half a
dozen or more students were living together in one room.
His catchword for groups in the intellectual milieu is
“company”.5 Zubok characterises intelligentsia as Anti-
Bolshevik from the very beginning of the Soviet Union.
That is turning the classical interpretation upside down –
classically Socialism was seen as part of the Russian intel-
ligentsia, or as Peter Struve even put it 1909: “Up to the2 Ibid., 197: “informelle Gesinnungs und Solidargemeinschaften”.
3 Yurchak, Everything Was Forever.
4 Zubok: Zhivago’s Children.
5 Ibid., 33–51.
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gentsiia, there only was an <educated class> and different
directions within that”.6
In my understanding the victory of the Bolsheviks – a
party led by intellectuals in 1917 – has to be analysedwithin
“the writings and ideas that have helped to shape the social
and political consciousness of modern Russia”.7 It would be
inconsistent to emphasise the inﬂuence Russian in-
tellectuals had on Russia and the modernworld in general,8
while excluding Bolshevism from the intelligentsia – the
world has taken interest in the history of the Russian intel-
ligentsiia mainly because it was seen as one of the roots of
the revolutions of 1917 and the global role, the Soviet Union
played for some decades, most of all between the defeat of
Germany in 1945 and the breakup of the Union in 1991.
The narrative “the intelligentsia against the state”, or
against Communism is not wrong, and it is corresponding
to many facts offered by the narrators. It is telling though,
that the research, which in the 1960s and 1970s was con-
ducted on the intellectual histories of more middle of the
road Soviet people like professional groups, does not
appear in the lists of literature, which Beyrau and Yurchak
offer. Or, to put it shortly – following this narrative it is
difﬁcult to tell the whole story. Stephan Merl9 has ques-
tioned recently, whether we really understand much of
modern dictatorships, if we interpret them purely as
quelling of a population, which we presume to be freedom-
loving right from the start, maybe by their nature (or even
by their “Wesen”). History does seem to be more compli-
cated, than the narrative of the intelligentsia against
communism implies. Obviously some dictatorships are
capable to communicate with considerable parts of “their”
people. The concepts, which these people develop and put
forward, and sometimes the feelings of bargaining-power
in the face of the powerful even may turn out as illusions.
But communication there was, and starting changes of
mind are discernable. This new interest in communication
in dictatorships is inviting to recall some of the research
done in the 1970s on the less outstanding groups of Soviet
society than the intelligentsia was.10 Used to reading the camouﬂaged talk of NS-perpetrators of mas-2. Notes from the inner circle of the party
Reading literary texts like Dr. Zhivago or highly sophis-
ticated ones like some Medvedevs “Truth is our strength”
might obscure the fact, that many arguments against the
powerfulwere simple. The risk to call crimes by their names
was great for a Soviet poet and could really be deadly for a
common person. But powerful Party-Members used, under
circumstances, language common to all of us and called a
misjudgement a failure and a willfull killing barbarious.
Within the Communist Party itself, within the organisation
of perpetrators many were aware, that the masscrimes6 Struve, Intelligentsiia i revoliutsiia, 151. For the change of many in-
tellectuals against Marxism before 1917 – see Smirnov, Ot marksizma k
idealizmu.
7 Raeff Anthology, 66 (introduction).
8 Malia, Intelligentsia?
9 Merl: Kommunikation in der Diktatur.committed were monstruous and the resources spent
without rationality were enormous. Differing to my
knowledge from NS-Texts, within the inner circle they did
not camouﬂage these crimes but called them by name.10
For instance in the meeting of the Presidium of the
Central Committee of the CPSU (TsCP) of January 30th. and
February 1st. 1956, where the “secret speech” of Chrush-
chev on the 20th. Party.convention was discussed before-
hand, positions varied between Molotov and Kaganovich
and the Secretary General (Gensek) and Mikojan. The ﬁrst
insisted, that in his speech the Gensek should point out,
that Stalin’s leadership brought socialism, while the Gensek
emphasised, that Stalin was “using most barbarious means,
destroyed the Party and was no Marxist”.11 Comparably on
May 26th. 1961, where the meeting of Kennedy and
Chrushchev in Vienna scheduled for Junewas prepared, the
Gensek upheld the position, that in the West “in my
opinion the social powergroups are rising and that there
will be no war”, while Mikojan countered “in my opinion,
they might start military measures without using Atomic
warfare”.12
Similar in the meeting of the Presidium of the Tsentral
Committee of October 13th. 1964,13 during which Chrush-
chevs term as secretary was ended, we ﬁnd quite differing
but mostly plain language arguments. Besides Chrushchev
and Brezhnev 15 members took the ﬂoor with a longer
statement. Some of the arguments were repeatedly used,
others not. For instance almost all agreed, that Chrushchevs
political stile had led to a new personality-cult around him.
Mzhavadnadze from Georgia put it simply – you think,
“everything is allowed to you”, Voronov put it as a replica of
Chrushchevs criticism of Stalin – “a new personality-cult”;
Suslov coined more theoretically as “violation of Lenins
principles of political leadership”. Shelest’ from the Ukraine
made that point quite explicitly. Many criticised, that
Chrushchev had weakened the role of the party, governed
by “zapiski” and not argued his decisions collectively. Five
criticised Chrushchevs campaign against the production-
managements – Shelest’, Voronov, Efremov, Grishin and
Rashhidov – four of these were party-workers from dis-
tricts with heavy industries – Ukraine, Ourals, Kursk and
Moscow. Five criticised the plans to divide obkomy and
rajkomy – Shelest’, Voronov, Mzhavadnadze from Georgia,
Mikojan and Rashhidov. Four criticised Chrushchev for
using family-ties in politics, three the lack of care for mil-
itary technology – Voronov from Chelyabinsk, Kossygin and
Podgornyj. Two attacked the housing-problems, but Shel-
est’was the only one to satirically point to the loss of power
of the republics: “responsibility and rights of the republics:
there is responsibility, but no rights”. Many criticised the
agrarian politics, Shelepin as “merrygoround”, but onlyscrimes this struck me as a difference. The latter talk of “Aktion”, “Aus-
siedlung”, “Umsiedlung” “Evakuierung” etc. when talking about
genocide; see Longerich, Ermordung. The propaganda in the occupied
territories of the SU differed and was in some nationalistic publications
more plainspoken, see Alt’man, Zhertvy nenavisti. 49–54.
11 Fursenko, Presidium CK, 97.
12 Ibid., 498.
13 Ibid., 862–872.
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villages with growing criminality. Only Grishin made the
quite general remark, that the technological level was
staying behind (behind whom he did not explicate, but it
does seem obvious, that he was comparing with the West).
In Foreign politics Shelepin said, that generally the
course against imperializm should have been more unre-
lenting, and criticised the Soviet stand in Suez – “on the
brink of war” – Berlin – “a loss” – and Kuba – “adven-
turous”. Mazurov pointed to the rise of nationalism as a
result of Chrushchevs politics, Suslov attacked Adzhubej’s
activities in foreign politics and Podgornyj was satirical. The
critic of Shelest’was more fundamental: “1957 we declared
as our aim, to catch up with and overtake the US, but that
was a complete failure. We discredited our actions” – but
his analysis was not discussed in this circle.
It hardly is possible to interpret all these arguments as
acts of representation of some special interest, maybe with
the exception of Shelest’, who later was accused of Ukrai-
nian nationalism. Plainwords were in use, and a failurewas
called that way. But we do not see a “fraction” or a political
party within the Communist Party. Rather the protocol is
indicating, that there were no organised “parties” (“frac-
tions” were forbidden14), despite the importance of the act
and despite different opinions on the topic and at least on
the reasons, for which the decision should be taken. The
“One-Party-System” showed, how it functioned – the main
decision had been taken before the meeting was convened.
The contributions in the meeting were not purely accla-
matory and a couple of interesting points was made, but
the discussion lacked the political structure necessary to
lead to a decision. Chrushchev accepted the critic from the
beginning, Mikojan defended him and some others payed
him respect, but in the end all voted unisono to send him
into pension.
The stage was set for politics in the Brezhnev-Period.
Our view tends to be, that the discussion of politics in
that period was channelled with the highest bodies of the
Party. The retirement of Chrushchev had shown, that
within the Party-oligarchy a sense of common interest had
developed, including the most basic acknowledgement of
personal safety. But as fear receded – how did political
discussions within the Party, the “new class”,15 work? And:
was there a chance for political discussions in the public, or
even political interest groups whichmight be seen as nuclei
of political “fractions” within the Communist Party,
although these were strictly forbidden?16 Kanet, Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies.
17 J. C. Davies: Human Nature in Politics, esp. p. 62.
18 In his war-memoirs “little country” Brezhnev actually offered a
catchword for such a localisms: Brezhnev: Malaja zemlja. For Putins “we”3. Indirect groups
3.1. Concept
Contemporary (and recent) research has been looking
for signs of broader political debates within Soviet society
during the 1960s and 1970s. While the concept of14 Brunner, Parteistatut, statute 1952 171–183, x 28; 1961, 185–200, x 27.
15 Djilas neue Klasse. The most convincing Marxist analysis of “really
existing socialism” originated in Poland: Kuron, Modzelewski:
Monopolsozialismus.totalitarianism in the analysis of the SU receded to a certain
degree, many researchers were using concepts related to
the “Behavioural Revolution”.16 It offered a new way of
looking at societies – neither with the Marxist concept of
class constituted by property of means of production, nor
by political systems constituted by formal power. Davies17
in this context already had pointed to the difference
between
1. Direct groups – people who knew one another –
research on such groups connected easily with research
on clientele-systems – and
2. Indirect groups, who act meaningful together without
necessarily knowing one another, for instance by sup-
porting a religious group, paying fees to an association,
acting within a national culture or reading the same
newspaper – interest groups.
My proposal was to adopt the terms of Davies to Soviet
conditions and discern between two kinds of groups:
1. Old indirect groups as religions, ethnic groups and na-
tions, and the intelligentsia, and
2. New indirect groups. The most obvious of these in
Brezhnev-times were the “we”, the “my” of regional or
urban localisms, from Brezhnev himself to Putin.18 In
many cases these were “new”, since the elites had been
moving or were being moved throughout the enormous
territory, but of course there also were “old” local “my”,
for instance in the Moscow intelligentsija. Looking for
connections or something like networks within the po-
litical system the professional groups did seem most
promising.19
3.1.1. Old indirect groups
First of all the religions in the Soviet Union formed
numerous indirect groups. We have a couple of contem-
porary studies on the intolerance of the Soviet System,20
but of course the religions carried on and especially pub-
lications on social contexts of religion in that system are
promising for our question. Deﬁnitely (open) adherence to
a religion had political consequences for the believer – he
could not be a member of the Party and therefore not reach
the better paid jobs, which were limited to the nomen-
klatura.21 The inﬂuence of religion as “milieu” for histori-
cally Orthodox, Lutheran, Armenian, Uniate, Jewish, Sunna,
Shia or Buddhist ethnic groups is difﬁcult to determine
though. We know, that such milieus existed and had in-
ﬂuence on clientele-groups. In Foreign politics we know,
that some religious hierarchies as that of the Russianof the “Pitertsy” see Gevorkjan et al, Ot pervogo litsa, for instance 120.
19 Nolte, Gruppeninteressen 46–61.
20 As Bourdeaux, Hebly Religious Liberty in the Soviet Union, or Janice
Brown: Conscience and Captivity. In a more historic vein for the periods up
to 1945 Nolte, Glaubensgemeinschaften.
21 Lane, Christian Religion; Nolte, Religiosität und Unterschicht.
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politics and for instance in contacts to the German Prot-
estant Churches.22
For the intelligentsia in the late 1960s a new form of
communication developed, coming from the old Russian
tradition of writing letters, which would be copied and sent
around: “samizdat”, edited by the author. In the SU books
andwhole Journals were typed and distributed to be copied
at some other place. The movement was difﬁcult to control.
In theWest these texts were collected and printed, not only
by the exile-press, but also in translations for a broader
public.23 Some of the most famous “letters” of Andrej
Sacharov were published in Samizdat ﬁrst and then in the
West, but not in the SU.24
A new generation of the Russian intelligentsija had
developed, characterised by often excellent University-
Degrees and opposition to the government. That
reminded of course to the old “Tsarist” intelligentsia – in
which you had to be against the regime to belong to it.25
Dietrich Beyrau has put the new generation into the
context of government-politics and associations,26 and
Vladislav Zubok has explained the topics and problem of
this “new Vanguard”. The intelligentsia in Russia is an old
indirect group with an intriguing intellectual history,
differing from the intellectual history of the bureaucracies
and the professionals inmany regards. For the intelligentsia
“the sources on the period are rich and amazingly varied:
ﬁction and nonﬁction publications that reﬂect the issues,
debates, and moods of the time, and manuscripts in
samizdat,.”.27 The intellectuals were (and are, I differ here
from Zubok, who thought he had witnessed the “last
intelligentsia”) – people who like to write and sometimes
seem to be addicted to writing. Of course they look to it,
that their writings are published and kept in archives. But
these groups, which commanded such an enormous degree
of media and public in the west, were not the decisive
groups 1990/1991.
As we know now, ethnic and national “belongings”
characterised the decisive groups in the end of the SU.28 Not
only, since national emigrations – Ukrainians, Baltics,
Georgians, Tatars etc. –were keeping up national and ethnic
agendas outside of the borders of the SU, but also, since
national republics constituted a fundamental institution of
the SU from within. Further, since the nation state was the
dominant political form of in the West in Soviet times,
Western interests were focussed on the question of ethnic
groups and nations in the SU. Fundamental for research in
GermanywasGerhard Simonsbookonnationalpolitics.29Of22 Kirchenamt der EKD, Hinhören, 98–211.
23 Belotserkovskiji, SSSR. Demokraticheskie al’ternativy, Medwedjew:
Aufzeichungen.
24 Sacharow, Stellungnahme.
25 Berlin, Russische Denker, especially on the dispute between Belinskij
and Gogol p. 233–239; see Churchward, Intelligentsia, especially 108–134.
26 Beyrau: Intelligenz und Dissens.
27 Zubak, Zhivago’s Children 438.
28 For an overview Katz et al, Handbook of major Soviet nationalities, New
York 1975; Rakowska-Harmstone in: Problems of Communism. .
29 Simon: Nationalismus, overviews Martiny, Nationen; Halbach,
Nationalitätenfrage.course, Hélène Carrère d’Encausse’s book inﬂuenced
research in Germany also.30 Both Simon and Carrère d’En-
causse saw the end of the SU as victory of the nations over
“the Empire”;31; my own research followed nation-building
by the cadres of the different national republics.
Not only with the knowledge of the latecomer we may
note, that nationalism formed one of the structural prob-
lems of the Union. But what inﬂuence did national senti-
ments or more precisely the governments of the national
republics have on Foreign Politics of the SU?
In terms of internal relations within the SU the republics
ﬁrst were important as statistical units. Comparing the
National-Product (the SU did not collect data for BIP),
membership in the Party or tertiary education per head the
republics differed considerably, and the differences rose –
in National-Product per head roughly from 2:1 between the
Baltic and the central-Asian republics in 1965 to 3:1 in
1989.32 The gap between the Soviet “North” and “South”
widened, despite efforts of the Central Government to
reduce it. The gap did, at least following the ofﬁcial data,
not widen as far as in the West;33 but that comparison was
of no political importance, since the Party did not make
that comparison. In the breakup of the SU economic dif-
ferences certainly played a role – for the Baltic republics,
where solidarity for Central Asia was questioned, and for
Russia and Azerbaidzhan, where the low energy-prices
were questioned, since these two republics were paying
for it.
As we know now, neither religions nor ethnic differ-
ences developed into “cracks in the Empire”. Rather the
existing national republics developed into nuclei of the
post-soviet polities. Neither Idel-Ural nor a Muslim Cen-
tral–Asia materialised, but several “subjects” of the Russian
Federation between Kasan and Ufa as well as ﬁve sovereign
states between Bishkek and Ashchabad. Tatar attempts to
correct their borders to Bashkortostan according to ethnic
majorities failed just as Russian ideas, that Northern
Kazakhstan with its Russian majority should become part
of the RF. The existing republics within their 1991 borders
developed into nation-states, led by their bureaucracies.
These republics claimed national traditions and under-
scored the importance of national studies worldwide,
although as mentioned ethnic groups and national re-
publics did not coincide. Today samizdat or underground-
Journals or political action of importance to the new na-
tions (which tend to consider themselves as quite old) are
part of their historical traditions.34 In fact the “confronta-
tion between the National Intelligentsia and the Commu-
nists” as Jan Zaprudnik haswritten, was to a large degree, at
least in Belorussia, organised by letters and samizdat-
papers, which then led to marches and protests35 and in30 Carrère d’Encausse: l’empire éclaté; translation to German with the
rather misleading title “Risse im Roten Imperium” Vienna 1979.
31 Carrère d’Encausse: La gloire des nations; Simon: Verfall und
Untergang.
32 Nolte, Geschichte Russlands, 381.
33 Nolte, Weltgeschichte, 237–260.
34 Sharifzhanov, Tatarstan; Zakiev: Istorija Tatarskogo naroda, 476–485.
35 Zaprudnik, Belarus, 121–144.
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3.1.2. New indirect groups: professionals
But not only did a new generation of intelligentsia
develop in Brezhnevs time, but also within the bureaucracy
different positions in politics, different worldviews became
more open. The sources for these groups are not at all as
well researched and documented, maybe, because their
views are not as rewarding toWestern researchers, because
they are not as afformative; maybe of course also, because
they are more middle of the road and not attempting to
solve in their own the problems of humanity, as is a
tradition in the intelligentsia.
Different professional groups in the SU were recognised
in Post-Stalin-Times. For instance in the debate on more
polytechnical education and a year of manual work
following school as obligatory in 1958 the Komsomol and
Chrushchev stood openly for this Proletarian change in the
school system, but were opposed in educational and liter-
ary Journals, and in the end the Komsomol did not succeed:
in the school reform no compulsory year of factory-labour
following school was introduced.36
The concept of “interest-groups” had, as H. Gordon
Skilling noted, already been used in the late 1950s and for
instance by Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1966.37 Together with
Franklyn Grifﬁths Skilling presented a collection of essays
on the topic; Boris Meissner followed up with a collection
of German research, and some introductory articles were
published.38 Milton C. Lodge opened research on this part
of the society more generally by analysing Soviet profes-
sional Journals.39 Lodge in his 1969 publication studied “the
full-time Party-functionaries (the apparatchiki) and four
specialist elites: the economic administrators, the military,
the literary intelligentsia, and the legal profession. By
content analysing representative periodicals for each elite,
data are collected on elite attitudes toward the Soviet po-
litical system. The overall goal is to determine the extent to
which the apparatchiki dominate the political process.”.40
For the Party-Apparatus he choose the Journals Kommunist
and Partijnaja Zhizn; for the Economic Elite Voprosy
_ekonomiki and Ekonomicheskaja gazeta, for the Military
Krasnaja Zvezda, for the legal profession Sovetskoe gosu-
darstvo and Sovetskaja justitsija and for the Literary Elite
Oktjabr, Literaturnaja Gazeta and Novy Mir. He established
for instance, what preferences the different elites had in
resource-allocations. The ﬁve groups researched by content
analysis of these Journals showed quite different and in the
years changing positions. One main ﬁnding was, that in the
years 1959–196541 in the researched Journals of the legal
profession no article was published advocating more allo-
cations in the military, but more than half of the examples36 Schwarz, Keech: Group Inﬂuence; Stewart: Soviet Interest Groups.
37 Skilling: Group Conﬂict.
38 Skilling, Grifﬁths, Interest Groups; German Pressure Groups in der
Sowjetunion (Vienna 1974); Meissner, Brunner, Gruppeninteressen.
39 Lodge, Soviet Elite Attitudes.
40 Ibid., 1.
41 Ibid., 76 f.advocated more allocations in agriculture; and the other
way round: three quarters of the sample of articles from
military Journals advocatedmore allocations in themilitary
and none more allocations in Education. Lodge established
also, that within the professional elites many thought, that
they should have more inﬂuence, and came to the conclu-
sion, that “the Soviet political system is competitive. By
1959–65 participatory elite attitudes and Party-elite con-
ﬂict reach levels which are incompatible with the ideo-
logical model. Party-specialist elite interdependence, not
apparatchiki dominance, characterizes Party-elite re-
lations.”42 In 1981 Lodge published amore explicit study on
his methods.43
Lodge’s study set the scene for more research on group-
interests, even in Soviet foreign policy.44 One had to keep in
mind, that hard facts on foreign policy were still more
difﬁcult to ﬁnd than those on general policy, so any analysis
had to put the weight on soft facts – travel accounts,
commentaries etc. In the German context Jürgen Ritsert
had presented the methods of qualifying text-analysis.45
There were some studies on journals at the time, most of
them aiming to establish the image of Western Germany in
the Soviet Union without asking for the differences be-
tween the Journals and in fact mostly on the Pravda.46
My question was, how the image of Germany changed
or remained the same for different interest groups
following the treaty of Moscow between the Federal Re-
public of Germany and the Soviet Union in 1970. Following
Lodge I hoped to ﬁnd an answer in professional Journals
and selected the years 1970–1972 for my analysis. It was
clear from the very beginning, that my study would not
reach the reliability of Lodges, since I did not ﬁnd a
colleague to do reliability-tests.
For the literary professions I choose the Journals Novyj
Mir and Oktjabr; for the economic Voprosy _ekonomiki, for
the Party Kommunist and Partijnaja Zhizn and for the
Military Krasnaja Zvezda. Since I worked alone, I could not
rely on quantifying as much as Lodge did and started with
normal historical text-analysis of articles published in these
six Journals during the three years. The differences were
obvious. For instance in Novyj Mir in 1971 Aleksandr
Ovcharenko published an article “Again at the Rhine”
stressing, that the federal Republic was changing, that
many people showed interest to the Soviet Union, and that
during the lectures he offered some critics – the SU as
antisemitic, its interior politics as questionable – were
fended off by the Germans themselves.47 In the Journal of
the Military profession Krasnaja Zvezda on the other hand,
colonel Markov wrote, that the Moscow treaty might
generate some support for the peace-politics of the SU, but
in the “camp of imperializm” many were trying to hinder
such a development, that NATO was holding maneuvers42 Ibid., 115. Compare Merl Kommunikation, 134–186.
43 Lodge, Magnitude Scaling.
44 Nolte, Gruppeninteressen.
45 Ritsert, Inhaltsanalyse.
46 Buchholz, Dietrich, Deutschland in der sowjetischen Publizistik; Men-
zel, Pfeiler, Deutschlandbilder; HSFK-Gruppe: Rezeption der Ostpolitik.
47 Ovcharenko: Snova na Reijna. That Twardowski had lost his job did
not end the liberal role of the Journal Novyj Mir.
53 Boden, Grenzen der Weltmacht.
54 Bassmann, Halbach ed., Politische Gefangene.
55 Lewitzki, Politische Opposition; Lewitzki, linke Opposition; see Med-
wedew, Wahrheit and Medwedew, Sowjetbürger in Opposition, 95–108.
56 Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Uni Bremen, Klagenfurter Str, D-
28359 Bremen.
57 For instance Michail Gefter: Vysochina Autsaider. See also, translated
to German Gefter: Mensch gegen Menschen.
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corroborated these ﬁndings by a quantifying analysis for
Krasnaja Zvezda, using ﬁve categories from very negative
ones to positive ones and comparing the image of the
Federal Republics with that of France and the United
Kingdom. In contrast to the friendly image of France the
Federal Republic in these three years was shown with
overwhelming percentages of negative news – excepting
only the time of the visit of Brandt in Oreanda and the ﬁnal
ratiﬁcation of the Moscow Treaty in Bonn itself. The image
of the Federal Republic as fascist receded over the years;
but negative news about the United Kingdom accumulated
“instead” – from a mixed picture in 1970 to an almost
exclusively negative one in 1972.49
In political terms the analysis of the professional papers
showed, that the Military kept their worldview of the SU as
in activemilitarydangerby imperializmdespite theMoscow
Treaty, while literarily oriented people welcomed the news,
that the West was changing. Together with the ﬁndings of
Lodge on resource-allocations cited above we may argue,
that the Military had found arguments, which legitimated
the high rate of defense-costs, which the SU kept up. The
Party, commanding a monopoly on hard facts and on polit-
ical decisions, followed the arguments of the Military.
Lena Jonson has investigated the newspapers Pravda,
Krasnaja Zvezda, Sovetskaja Rossija and Literaturnaja Gaz-
ety for their tendencies towards the Federal republic, also
combining some methods of qualitative and quantitative
content analysis. She sums up, that “Pravda presents an
image of West Germany as a <partner>, while the
>enemy< image dominates in Krasnaja Zvezda. The posi-
tion of Sovetskaja Rossija is not as clear-cut but mainly an
>enemy< image is presented. Regarding images of the
Western Alliance, Pravda describes the alliance as
>divided<, Krasnaja Zvezda as >united< and Sovetskaja
Rossija again takes a position somewhere in between”.50
My own follow-up research on the Journals Kommunist
Vooruzhennych Sil, Novy Mir and Voprosy _ekonomiki for
the year 1980 conﬁrmed the results – the Journal of the
Military showed a worldview of growing military dangers,
while the Economic Journal pointed to the fast develop-
ment of capitalism and called for investments.51 We know,
that the Party decided, to increase the defense burden.
The differences of opinions between the professional
Journals concerned general worldviews and habitus, soft
facts, and it is difﬁcult to connect these to political de-
cisions. Jiri Valenta though has convincingly reconstructed
the Soviet decision to intervene 1968, mainly using Cze-
choslovak remembrances, and identiﬁed a “coalition of the
Advocates of Military Intervention”, namely representa-
tives of the western republics, TsC ofﬁcials for Ideology,
leading Party-members from some cities, the safety-
personnel and most (not all) representatives from the
armed forces.52 Ragna Boden has shown the role of48 Mar’kov: Palki v kolesa.
49 Nolte Gruppeninteressen 116 f.
50 Jonson, Soviet Policy Debate 122.
51 Nolte, Globale Politik 70.
52 Valenta: Soviet Intervention 21–25.scientiﬁc institutions in Soviet foreign politics, and their
limits – using inter alia the scientiﬁc publications of the
institutions. Her example is Indonesia.534. Further research
For reasons of academic hierarchy, lack of funds and
not the least inaccessibility of Soviet leaders for in-
terviews questioning “the unity of the Party” it was not
possible to go on with this research in the 1980s.
Following the end of the SU conditions for research
improved, as the possibilities to use archival material in
Russia or the other republics increased, at least for
Chrushchevs period, less for Brezhnevs. Collections of
sources were published, as the Protocols of the TsK quoted
in the beginning. That will inform about the opinions or at
least positions of political leaders. What sources are
there?
On the history of dissidents there are letters and
written protests not only of intellectuals, but also of for
instance of more middle of the road imprisoned people
from this period, and some already early were printed in
the West.54 Oppositional writings from the intelligentsia,
mostly in Samizdat, have been collected and published in
the West early.55 The different pieces of samizdat also
were archived in the West – the archive in Bremen,
founded by Wolfgang Eichwede, is owning more than
100.000 texts of all kinds from dissidents in Eastern
Europe.56 Publications of articles, which could not be
published before 1991, of course also belong to these in-
formations about changes of mind in the Intellgentsia.57
The decisions of the Ideological Committee of the CP by
the way are being published.58
What sources are there though to inform us on the
changes of mind of the people in the middle of society?
Obviously Egotextes will play a growing role. Diaries have
been successfully used for the period of Stalinism.59 John
Hellbeck has carried on his studies into Brezhnev-times,
and Irina Savkina has analysed the diary of a “Soviet girl”
1968–1970.60 There ought to be many more diaries still in
the cupboards and desks.
Oral history not only is a precondition for everyday-
history – as Niethammer has demonstrated on post-war-
Germany,61 but also may contribute to political history, as
Valenta showed. Oral history testimonies have been used58 Ajmermakher, Kul’tura i vlast’.
59 Garros-Castaing, Facetts, Grechanaja: Bibliography; Helbeck: Revo-
lution on my mind. For the diary of one of the perpetrators see Scher-
bakowa: Tagebuch. I used the diary of the historian N. M. Druzhinin on
1941–1942: Nol’te: Ot sovetskogo patriotizma k rossijskomu
nacionalizmu.
60 Hellbeck: Last Soviet Dreamer; Savkina: Dnevnik Sovetskoj Devushki.
61 Niethammer, Die Jahre, die weiß man nicht.
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the history of the victims.62
Then there were and continue to be memoires – ﬁrst
thousands of them from the 2nd.World-War, from generals
of all the sides, from soldiers and civilians, from some, who
were children at the time63 also fromvictims.64 From Soviet
actors, as of course Chrushchev, but also from emigrants.65
Of course we all know, that memoires tend to show the
author in too friendly lights.
Another very interesting source for worldviews and
opinions are, surprisingly, elections. There have been
studies on the “missing one percent” earlier. New research
is focussing on the election-campaigns, in which – for
instance inMoscow – some 15% of the population took part.
The elections are seen as “highly ritualised forms of
communication” – citizens are confrontedwith the “power”
and asked for consent. That did offer maneuvering-space
for voters also, if mainly on the local and regional levels,
since the careers of bureaucrats depended on 99%.66
Another source might be the history of exchange-
students, who had visited the US or other Western
countries.67
For sentiments, concepts and daily life of the people
from the higher echelons of the Party to poor Old be-
lievers or old women living in the countryside the Media
in general and Newspapers and Journals in special will
most probably remain a strong place for research, at least
in the west, since the costs are not as high as for in-
terviews and research in the social archives in Russia it-
self. Generally newspapers are not too difﬁcult to ﬁnd
and not to expensive to work with. For radio and TV one
may have to ask archival permissions. There is introduc-
tory research on the Media, a discussion of methods and
some ﬁrst overview.68 Mass-Media grew in importance in
this period, and the number of TV-sets in Soviet house-
holds increased between 1955 and 1969 from 1 to 25
millions.69
The Media still now promise insights to the 1970s and
1980s in the SU – diversifying of worldviews and changes of
minds.5. Conclusions for the political system
In 1979 the conclusionwas, that the Soviet System acted
against the rules of international politics, keeping up a high
rate of arms production and defense-status, while making
treaties with international partners (in my case the Federal
Republic) who worked for a general Détente including62 Some of the ﬁrst to do this kind of research was the group connected
with Ales’ Adamovich: Zusammen mit dem Volk. My experience in this
ﬁeld: Nolte, Häftlinge aus der UdSSR.
63 For our topic see Bernd Bonwetsch ed.: Kriegskindheit und Nachk-
riegsjugend in zwei Welten, Essen, Klartext, 2009.
64 Abramowitsch, Nolte: Die Leere in Slonim; Svirnovskaja, Überleben.
65 For instance for our topic Yanov: Détente.
66 Jessen, Richter, Voting, 17.
67 Richmond: Cultural exchange.
68 Mickiewicz: Media; Paderin: Obshhestvennoe mnenie; Koschwitz,
Massenkommunikation.
69 Roth-Ey, Television, here p. 282.lowering defense-costs. Of course parliamentary systems
make similar mistakes in not adjusting their political op-
tions to a changing international scenario, but the fact, that
the changes of mind in the nonmilitary professions could
not be argued openly and recurring on hard facts, deﬁnitely
made it more easy for the Party to keep to an inadequate
decision.
The idea, that the SU was in fact endangering the West
never was very convincing to anybody who knew, how
little effective Soviet institutions and Soviet economy
were. Therefore it was difﬁcult to follow the understand-
ing, that the Soviet military buildup really was threatening
NATO.70 Rather on the other side the conclusion might be,
that the decision to carry on with a rate of defence of more
than 15% of the BSP in order to keep up “parity” with the
West was one of the reasons for the fall of the SU; in case
the government would have put 10% less of the resources
into defense and much of these into RAD and new in-
vestments, the economy would have fared better.71
Therefore it does seem safe to judge, that keeping
defence costs high was a heavy political mistake. From the
view of classical democracy theory it does seem probable,
that a political system offering room for open discussions
between representatives of different old and new indirect
groups would have had more chances to avoid this
mistake.
E negativo though it is obvious, that despite changing
minds in different indirect groups on important issues no
organised Multi-Party-System had been in the making in
the 1970s. In order to tell, what really was in the making
and whether there were other options than the break-
down, more research seems promising. My thesis is, that
these differing worldviews, these changes of mind in a
broader public set the scene for the intelligentsia and
is ﬁghtings for more publicity in the debates. But for a
change in direction of a Parliamentary system it did not
sufﬁce to allow different worldviews and differing in-
formations on soft facts, rather it was necessary to allow
fractions or outspoken political groups disputing the hard
facts also (for instance the biased mistakes of the Statis-
tical Ofﬁce).
1. Sources (memoirs, articles, collections of documents)
Abramowitsch, L. I., & Nolte, H.-H. (2005). Die Leere in Slonim. Dortmund.
Belotserkovskiji, V. (Ed.). (1978). SSSR. Demokraticheskie al’ternativy.
Achberg.
Bonwetsch, B. (Ed.). (2009). Kriegskindheit und Nachkriegsjugend in zwei
Welten. Essen.
Brezhnev, L. I. (1979): Malaja zemlja. In The same: Leninskom kursom Tom
7 (pp. 7–53), Moskva.
Brunner, G. (Ed.). (1965). Das Parteistatut der KPdSU 1905–1961. Köln.
Fursenko, A. A. (Ed.). (2003). Presidium CK KPSS 1954-1964, Chernovye
protokol’nye zapisi zasedanij Stenogrammy, Postanovlenija, Tom 1.
Moskva.
Gefter, M. (1992). Der Mensch gegen und für den Menschen, and: “Wenn
wir sie vertrieben haben”. In H.-H. Nolte (Ed.), Der Mensch gegen den
Menschen (pp. 25–47). Hannover.
Lewitzki, B. (Ed.). (1972). Politische Opposition in der Sowjetunion 1960–
1972. München.70 As for example Poser, Militärmacht Sowjetunion did. More convincing
to me was Lutz, Die Rüstung der Sowjetunion.
71 Nolte, Geschichte Russlands, 377 f.
H.-H. Nolte / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 122–130 129Lewitzki, B. (Ed.). (1974). Die linke Opposition in der Sowjetunion.
Hamburg.
Longerich, P. (Ed.). (1989). Die Ermordung der europäischen Juden. Eine
umfassende Dokumentation des Holocaust 1941–1945. München.
Mar’kov, A. Palki v kolesa. In Krasnaja Zvezda 18.09.1970.
Medwedew, R. A. (1971). In Die Wahrheit ist unsere Stärke. Geschichte und
Folgen des Stalinismus. German, Frankfurt.
Medewedjew, R. (1973). Sowjetbürger in opposition (in German), Hamburg.
Medewedjew, R. (Ed.). (1977). Aufzeichungen aus dem sowjetischen
Untergrund (in German), Hamburg.
Nolte, H.-H. (Ed.). (2001). Häftlinge aus der UdSSR in Bergen-Belsen.
Frankfurt.
Ovcharenko, A. (1971). Snova na Reijna. Novyj Mir, 11, 211–237.
Putin, Gevorkjan, N., Timakova, N., & Kolesnikov, A. (2000). Ot pervogo
litsa, razgovory s Vladimirom Putinym. Moskva.
Raeff, M. (Ed.). (1966). Russian intellectual history. An anthology. without
place.
Sacharow, A. (1974). Dimitriewitsch, Stellungnahme (in German), Vienna.
Scherbakowa, I. In dem Tagebuch liegt mein ganzes Leben. In The same,
Zerrissene Erinnerung (pp. 63–89). Göttingen.
Struve, P. B. (1991). Intelligentsiia i revoliutsiia. In N. Kazakova (Ed.), Vekhi.
Intelligentsiia v Rossii 1909–1910 (pp. 136–152). Moskva.
Svirnovskaja, F. B. (2004). Überleben in deutschen Konzentrationslagern.
In H.-H. Nolte, R. Averkorn, et al. (Eds.), Europa und die Welt in der
Geschichte, Festschrift Dieter Berg (pp. 1223–1244). Bochum.
Vysochina, E. (Ed.). (1996). Autsaider. Chelovek voprosa, Tom 1–3.
Moskva.2. Secondary literature, alphabetical
Adamowitsch, A. (1992). Zusammen mit dem Volk geschrieben. In H.-
H. Nolte (Ed.), Der Mensch gegen den Menschen (pp. 48–65). Hannover.
Ajmermakher, K. (Ed.). (2000). Kul’tura i vlast’ ot Stalina do Gorbacheva.
Moskva.
Alt’man, I. (2002). Zhertvy nenavisti, Anatomija kholokosta. Moskva.
Bassmann, W., & Holbach, A.-H. (Eds.). (1976). Politische Gefangene in der
Sowjetunion. München.
Berlin, I. (1981). Russische Denker (in German), Frankfurt.
Beyrau, D. (1993). Intelligenz und Dissens. Die russischen Bildungsschichten
in der Sowjetunion 1917 bis 1985. Göttingen.
Boden, R. (2006). Die Grenzen der Weltmacht. Sowjetische Indonesienpolitik
von Stalin bis Breznev. Stuttgart.
Boris, M., & Brunner, G. (Eds.). (1975). Gruppeninteressen im Entschei-
dungsprozess der Sowjetunion. Köln.
Bourdeaux, M., & Hebly, H. (Eds.). (1976). Religious liberty in the Soviet
Union. West Wickham/Kent.
Buchholz, A., & Dietrich, J. (1964). Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der
sowjetischen Publizistik. Köln.
Carrère d’Encausse, H. (1978). L’empire éclaté. Paris.
Carrère d’Encausse, H. (1990). La gloire des nations. Paris.
Churchward, L. G. (1973). The Soviet Intelligentsia. London.
Davies, J. C. (1963). Human nature in politics. New York.
Dietrich s. Buchholz.
Djilas, M. (1957). Die neue Klasse (in German), München.
Garros-Castaing, V. (2009). Facetts du Journal Personnel Russe, Grechanaja
Elena: Bibliography. In Cahiers du Monde Russe 50.1 (pp. 169–185).
Gordon, S. H. (1970). Group conﬂict and political change. In C. Johnson
(Ed.), Change in communist systems (pp. 215–234). Stanford/Cal.
Gordon, S. H., & Franklyn, G. (Eds.). (1973). Interest groups in Soviet politics.
Princeton/NJ.
Grechannaja s. Garros-Castaing.
Grifﬁths s. Skilling.
Halbach, U. (2003). Nationalitätenfrage und Nationalitätenpolitik. In
P. Hg. Stefan (Ed.), Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands, Bd. V; (pp. 659–
786). Stuttgart.
Harned s. Katz.
Hebly s. Bourdeaux.
Helbeck, J. (2006). Revolution on my mind, writing a diary under Stalin.
Cambridge/MA.
Hellbeck, J. (2009). The last Soviet dreamer. In Cahiers du Monde Russe
50.1 (pp. 139–152).
Janice, B. (1988). Conscience and captivity, religion in eastern Europe.
Washington, DC.
Jessen, R., & Richter, H. (Eds.). (2011). Voting for Hitler and Stalin. Elections
under 20th. Century dictatorships. Frankfurt.
Jonson, L. (1986). The Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany:
Soviet Policy Debate in the Press 1975–1981. Cooperation and Conﬂict,
21, 119–131.
Jürgen, R. (1972). Inhaltsanalyse und Ideologiekritik. Frankfurt.
Kanet, R. E. (Ed.). (1971). The behavioral revolution and communist studies.
Applications of behaviorally oriented political research on the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. New York.Katz, Z., Rogers, R., & Harned, F. (Eds.). (1975). Handbook of major Soviet
nationalities. New York.
Keech s. Schwarz.
Kirchenamt der, E. K. D. (2003). Kirchliches Außenamt des Moskauer Patri-
archats Hg.: Hinhören und Hinsehen, Slyshat’ i videt’ drug druga. Leipzig.
Koschwitz, H.-J. (Ed.). (1979). Massenkommunikation in der UdSSR. Sow-
jetische Beiträge zur empirischen Soziologie der Journalistik. München.
Kuron, J., & Modzelewski, K. (1969). Monopolsozialismus (in German),
Hamburg.
Lane, C. (1978). Christian religion in the Soviet Union. London.
Lodge, M. C. (1969). Soviet elite attitudes since Stalin. Columbus/Ohio.
Lodge, M. C. (1981). Magnitude scaling. Quantitative measurement of
opinions. Beverly Hills/Cal.
Lutz, D. S. (Ed.). (1979). Die Rüstung der Sowjetunion. Baden-Baden.
Malia, M. (1962). Was ist die Intelligentsia? In R. Pipes (Ed.), Die russische
Intelligentsia (pp. 11–33) (in German), Stuttgart.
Martiny, A. Nationen und Nationalitätenpüolitik. In Schramm Handbuch
(pp. 1744–1778).
Masaryk, T. G. (1992). Russische Geistes- und Religionsgeschichte, Bd. 1–2.
New edition Frankfurt, Büchergilde Gutenberg.
Menzel, J. P., & Pfeiler, W. (1972). Deutschlandbilder. Die Bundesrepublik aus
der Sicht der DDR und der Sowjetunion. Düsseldorf.
Mickiewicz, E. P. (1981). Media and the Russian public. New York.
Modzelewski s. Kuron.
Niethammer, L. (Ed.). (1991). Die Jahre, die weiß man nicht, wo man sie
heute hinsetzen soll. New edition. Berlin.
Nol’te, G.-G. (2008). Ot sovetskogo patriotizma k rossijskomu naciona-
lizmu: 1941–1942. In M. B. Korchagina, & V. V. Ishhenko (Eds.), Ger-
manija i Rossija v sud’be istorika, Festschrift Jakov Samojlovich Drabkin
(pp. 171–182). Moskva.
Nolte, H.-H. (1979). Gruppeninteressen und Außenpolitik. Göttingen.
Nolte, H.-H. (1981). Religiosität und Unterschicht in der sowjetischen
Gesellschaft. Gegenwartskunde, 2, 177–186.
Nolte, H.-H. (März 1985). Globale Politik und Gruppeninteressen in der
Sowjetunion. Deutsche Studien, 89(23), 46–70.
Nolte, H.-H. (1992). Die Glaubensgemeinschaften und die Religionspolitik
des Staates. In G. Schramm (Ed.), Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands III
(Vol. 2); (pp. 1709–1741). Stuttgart.
Nolte, H.-H. (1997). Überforderung und Pathos: ein Aufriß. In H.-
P. Waldhoff, D. Tan, & E. Kürsat-Ahlers (Eds.), Brücken zwischen den
ZivilisationenZur politischen Kultur halbperipherer Länder (pp. 63–82).
Frankfurt.
Nolte, H.-H. (2004). Töten in Belorussland 1936–1944. In P. Gleichmann, &
T. Kühne (Eds.), Massenhaftes Töten. Kriege und Genozide im 20. Jahr-
hundert ¼ Beiträge zur Historischen Friedensforschung 2 (pp. 143–157).
Essen.
Nolte, H.-H. (2009). Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Wien.
Nolte, H.-H. (2012). Geschichte Russlands. Stuttgart.
Nolte, H.-H., Eschment, B., & Vogt, J. (1994). Nationenbildung östlich des
Bug. Hannover.
Paderin, V. K. (1980). Obshhestvennoe mnenie v razvitom socialisticheskom
obshhestve. Kazan.
Pfeiler s. Menzel.
Poser, G. (1977). Militärmacht Sowjetunion 1977. Wien.
Rakowska-Harmstone, T. (1974). The dialectics of nationalism in the USSR.
In Problems of communism 23.3 (pp. 1–22).
Richmond, Y. (2003). Cultural exchange and the Cold War. Raising the iron
curtain. University Park/PA.
Rogers s. Katz.
Roth-Ey, K. (2007 Spring). Finding a home for television in the USSR
1950–1970. Slavic Review, 278–306.
Savkina, I. (2009). Dnevnik Sovetskoj Devushki. In Cahiers du Monde Russe
50.1 (pp. 153–167).
Schwarz, J. J., & Keech, W. R. (1968). Group inﬂuence and the policy-
process in the Soviet Union. The American Political Science Quarterly,
62, 84–85.
Sharifzhanov, I. I. (1997). Tatarstan after Sovereignty. In H.-H. Nolte (Ed.),
Europäische Innere Peripherien im 20 (pp. 269–282). Jahrhundert,
Stuttgart.
Simon, G. (1986). Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik in der Sowjet-
union. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Simon, G., & Nadja, S. (1993). Verfall und Untergang des sowjetischen Im-
periums. München.
Smirnov, I. P. (1995). In M. I. Tugan Baranovskii, S. N. Bulgakov, &
N. A. Berdjaev (Eds.), Ot marksizma k idealizmu. Moskva.
Stephan, M. (2012). Politische Kommunikation in der Diktatur. Deutschland
und die Sowjetunion im Vergleich. Göttingen.
Stewart, Ph. D. (1969). Soviet interest groups and the policy-process. In
World politics: Vol. 22 p. 19–50.
H.-H. Nolte / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 122–130130Valenta, J. (1981). Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968. Anatomy of a
decision. Baltimore/Maryland.
Yanov, A. (1977). Détente after Brezhnev: The domestic roots of Soviet
foreign policy. Berkeley.
Yurchak, A. (2005). Everything was forever, until it was no more. The last
Soviet generation. Princeton/NJ.Zakiev, M. Z. (2008). Istorija Tatarskogo naroda, Etnicheskie korni, for-
mirovanie i razvitie. Moskva.
Zaprudnik Jan, B. (1993). At a crossroads in history. Boulder/Colorado.
Zubok, V. (2009). Zhivago’s children. The last Russian intelligentsia. Cam-
bridge/Mass.
